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POST-LEGISLATIVE SCRUTINY OF LEGISLATION DERIVED FROM 
THE EUROPEAN UNION 
 
Lydia Clapinska 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The fundamental purpose of this thesis is to assess critically how legislation deriving 
from the European Union is, and should be, reviewed after it has been brought into 
force. The inspiration for this paper derives from two factors, first, the recent 
explosion in interest in ‘better regulation’ in Europe and second, the growing interest 
in post-legislative scrutiny of domestic legislation in the UK. There are numerous 
drives and endeavours towards ‘better lawmaking’ and ‘better regulation’ but what do 
these concepts actually mean and are there corresponding attempts to monitor not 
only the drives towards improving the quality of legislation but the actual 
effectiveness of legislation once it has been brought into force? The working 
hypothesis for this paper is that too little attention has been given to the review of EU 
legislation after it has been brought into force at both the national and EU level. The 
overarching research questions may be expressed as follows: 
 
1.  What work is already undertaken at national and EU level in terms of monitoring 
the effects of past legislation in order to ensure that it has met its objectives and is 
working in practice as intended?  
 
2. How does this evaluation work fit in with the drives towards better regulation and 
better lawmaking? 
 
3. What has been the effect of impact assessments and could this form of analysis be 
used as a basis for future review of measures? 
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4. What further work should be undertaken in terms of evaluation of past measures 
and which body should take lead responsibility for this work in order to ensure a 
coherent approach? 
 
5. Is there scope for a new independent body to assist the EU institutions (and 
Member States) with evaluating past legislation? 
 
 Methodology   
 This paper is written from the British perspective and this is reflected in the focus of 
the research which is on two levels, covering the analysis of UK domestic scrutiny of 
European legislation and the analysis of scrutiny processes undertaken at EU level, 
namely by the European Commission and the European Parliament. The justification 
for this methodology has its foundations in the belief that it is only by understanding 
and analysing existing scrutiny processes at both levels that the gaps can be revealed 
and also that a way forward, by building on what already exists, can be forged.  The 
other aspect of the reasoning behind the methodology is that it is necessary to 
examine the respective roles of the Institutions of the EU and the UK Parliament in 
order to ascertain where responsibility for post-legislative scrutiny of European 
legislation should lie. Rather than undertake a rigid comparative analysis between 
some or all of the EU Member States (which risks being predominantly descriptive), 
the preferred approach in this paper is to focus more deeply on the scrutiny system in 
the UK, as just one Member State, but one which has quite a progressive approach 
towards better regulation. Of course, where innovative approaches by other Member 
States have been identified, these are included in the analysis. It is worth noting at this 
preliminary stage that in the UK context, the term ‘post-legislative scrutiny’ is 
preferred while in the European context, the term ‘ex post evaluation’ or ‘ex post 
assessment’ is more likely to be used. All of these terms are used interchangably in 
this paper and are taken to have the same broad meaning (unless the context indicates 
otherwise), that it, the review of legislation in practice after it has been brought into 
force. 
 
Structure 
The structure of the paper reflects the methodology. This paper is divided into five 
parts. Part 1 provides a brief, critical introduction to the concept of evaluation and 
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also considers developments in post-legislative scrutiny of national legislation in the 
UK. Part 2 examines the nature of EU legislation with a view to suggesting the 
different purposes of post-legislative scrutiny at national and EU level and also 
demonstrating the impact of EU legislation on the UK. Part 3 analyses developments 
in pre-legislative and post-legislative scrutiny in the UK of legislation derived from 
the EU, with an additional focus on the particular challenges that arise in relation to 
the transposition of Directives, and on the dawn of impact assessment culture. Part 4 
critiques the explosion of interest in better regulation in Europe and how evaluation 
ties in with this before analysing what is and should be done in terms of post-
legislative scrutiny of EU legislation by the Institutions, especially the Commission 
and Parliament. Part 5 contains the conclusions with an emphasis on what the future 
may hold for evaluation of EU legislation after it has been brought into force. 
 
Sources 
This paper draws on a wide variety of sources. The key concepts addressed are of 
important practical significance, which required analysis of UK Parliamentary and 
Governmental reports and debates and many very recent EU documents as well as 
more traditional academic material. In order to enhance the research for this paper and 
also to gain practical insights into scrutiny processes at EU level, the author also 
visited Brussels to carry out interviews with officials in the European Parliament and 
European Commission to hear first hand about evaluation initiatives, the challenges 
faced and the hopes for the future. 
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PART 1: THE CONCEPT OF EVALUATION 
 
Post-legislative scrutiny is like motherhood and apple pie in that everyone 
appears to be in favour of it. However, unlike motherhood and apple pie, it is 
not much in evidence.1 
 
Legislative methodology 
The first sentence in the quotation above is a logical statement, if evaluation of 
legislation is considered to be a key component of legislative methodology and this is 
a difficult argument to refute. In manufacturing, industry and across the private sector, 
‘quality control’ is a familiar phrase – checking that your product or service works in 
practice is fundamental to the success of any business. However, when it comes to 
legislation, this process of assessment or evaluation seems to be a concept which is 
only just beginning to gain ground. Professor Luzius Mader explains that evaluation 
of legislation is particularly concerned with normative contents and their 
consequences in the social reality and he advocates the following methodical 
approach: 
 
(1) the analysis and definition of the problem that legislative action presumes to 
solve; 
(2) the determination or clarification of the goals of legislation; 
(3) the examination of legal instruments or means that can be used to solve the 
problem and the choice of such instruments (based – among other things upon 
a prospective evaluation of their possible effects); 
(4) the drafting of the normative content; 
(5) the formal enactment; 
(6) the implementation; 
(7) the retrospective evaluation; and  
(8)  if necessary or appropriate, the adaptation of legislation on the basis of the 
retrospective evaluation.2 
 
                                                 
1 House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution, 14th Report, (2003-04), Parliament and the 
Legislative Process, HL 173-I, p 42. 
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Steps (1) to (8) form part of one continuous process. Mader describes it as a 
“reiterative learning process” in which the evaluation of effects is a fundamental 
prerequisite, ensuring the legislator’s responsiveness to social reality and the social 
adequacy of legislative action.3 It is interesting to juxtapose this eminently sensible 
approach and reasoning with the reality. In the UK, it has been observed that 
Parliament lacks systematic feedback from those groups and individuals affected by 
laws to enable it to learn from its mistakes. Bills tend to be treated as self-contained 
entities, virtually in isolation from what has gone before and from what may happen 
later, whereas most Bills are only an exclamation point in a continuous process of 
developing and applying policy.4 Although these observations were made in 1976, 
they still ring true in 2006. Mader’s steps (7) and (8) are not often followed and it is 
even difficult in many cases to find documentary evidence of step (2). With regard to 
EU legislation, the problems are exacerbated, as we shall see, with problems 
frequently arising at step (6) and a lack of clear ownership of responsibility for stages 
(7) and (8).  It has long been recognised that it is proposals for new EU measures that 
receive the bulk of attention from the main EU institutions, while the review of 
legislation approved in the past tends to be neglected even though such a review could 
improve future legislation.5 Luzius Mader has written that, in short, the evaluation of 
legislation is “a pragmatic effort to improve the legislator’s assumptions and 
knowledge about the effects of legislation” but cautions that “it aims more at 
plausibility in this field, not at certainty or scientific proof”.6  
 
Developments in post-legislative scrutiny of national legislation 
The UK Parliament first made calls for “post-legislation” committees more than thirty 
five years ago when the House of Commons Select Committee on Procedure 
published a report noting that: 
 
                                                                                                                                            
2 Mader, L, Evaluating the Effects: A Contribution to the Quality of Legislation, Statute Law Review, 
2001, Volume 22, Number 2, 119 at 121. 
3 Ibid., at 122. 
4 Study of Parliament Group, Evidence on House of Commons Procedure, 1976, para 19, submitted to 
the House of Commons Select Committee on Procedure and printed with its First Report of Session 
1977-78, as Appendix 1 to the Minutes of Evidence (HC 588-III, pp 1-20). 
5 Mather, G & Vibert, F, European Policy Forum, Evaluating Better Regulation: Buildng the System, A 
report for the City of London Corporation, September 2006, p 4 to 5. 
6 Mader, L, Evaluating the Effects: A Contribution to the Quality of Legislation, Statute Law Review, 
2001, Volume 22, Number 2, 119 at 124. 
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Pressure of Government business in each session often reduces the 
chance of securing a place in the legislative programme for a Bill 
to amend an Act passed within recent years. For this reason, years 
may pass before Parliament has an opportunity to consider 
legislation embodying amendments to a recent Act, the need for 
which has become imperative following, for example, a judgment 
in the courts, difficulties in interpretation, impracticality in 
everyday use, or the nature of the delegated legislation made under 
its authority.7 
 
This reasoning is still relevant today and the calls for some form of post-legislative 
scrutiny are still being made. In October 2004, the House of Lords Constitution 
Committee published its report, ‘Parliament and the Legislative Process’  in which the 
Committee recommended that most Acts other than Finance Acts, should normally be 
subject to review within three years of their commencement, or six years following 
their enactment, whichever is the sooner.8 In a House of Lords debate following the 
publication of this report, Lord Norton of Louth who was Chairman of the 
Constitution Committee at the time the report was made, stated that: 
 
The implementation stage of legislation constitutes a Parliamentary 
black hole. By addressing it… there is the potential to develop a 
new and significant role for Parliament, ensuring that it plays a role 
at all stages of the legislative process.9 
 
Post-legislative scrutiny is the subject of a project currently being undertaken by the 
Law Commission of England and Wales.10 The Law Commission published a 
consultation paper on post-legislative scrutiny in January 2006.11 The focus of the 
Law Commission project is on the post-legislative scrutiny of primary, domestic 
                                                 
7 House of Commons Select Committee on Procedure (1970-71), The Process of Legislation, HC 538, 
p viii. 
8 House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution, 14th Report, (2003-04), Parliament and the 
Legislative Process, HL 173-I, para 180. 
9 House of Lords Hansard, 6 June 2005, vol 672, no 10, col 752. 
10 The author of this paper must declare an interest at this point, as the lawyer with responsibility for 
the Law Commission project on post-legislative scrutiny. 
11 Law Commission Consultation Paper No 178 (2006), Post-legislative Scrutiny. 
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legislation. In preparing its consultation paper, the Law Commission undertook an 
extensive pre-consultation exercise in order to gain insights into different aspects of 
post-legislative scrutiny from Parliamentarians, Parliamentary Counsel, Parliamentary 
clerks, Government officials, academics and others, based on the premise that, in 
general, post-legislative scrutiny referred to the review of Acts of Parliament once 
they have been brought into force.12 Although ‘post-legislative’ scrutiny undoubtedly 
means different things to different people, the Law Commission extracted from its 
early consultation that the main motivation for post-legislative scrutiny was that 
legislation should be reviewed after it has been brought into force to see whether it is 
working out in practice as intended and if not to discover why and to address how any 
problems can be remedied quickly and cost-effectively.13 The ultimate benefit is that 
it has the potential to improve the accountability of governments for legislation and 
lead to better and more effective law.14 The Law Commission also identified a 
scrutiny spectrum ranging from narrow through to broad forms of review. This was 
set out as follows: 
      A narrow form of review might be limited to considering: 
• Have all the provisions been brought into force? 
• Has the legislation given rise to difficulties in interpretation? 
• Has the legislation had unintended legal consequences? 
 
A broader form of review would address the question whether the Act has 
delivered what was intended in practical as well as legal terms. This would 
involve questions such as: 
• Have the policy objectives been achieved? 
• Has the legislation had unintended economic or other consequences? 
• Has it been over-cumbersome? 
• Do any steps need to be taken to improve its effectiveness/operation? 
• Have things changed so that it is no longer needed?15 
 
                                                 
12 Ibid., p 6. 
13 Law Commission Consultation Paper No 178 (2006), Post-legislative Scrutiny, p 30. 
14 Ibid., p 32 
15 Law Commission Consultation Paper No 178 (2006), Post-legislative Scrutiny, p 47. 
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The Law Commission consultation paper reveals that although post-legislative 
scrutiny of domestic legislation is undertaken at times by Government departments, 
Parliamentary committees, the Law Commission, the courts and others, the overall 
picture is that it is not systematic and there are many gaps.16 However, it is apparent 
that the momentum for post-legislative scrutiny is increasing. Part of the reason for 
this is that as a evaluation can be seen as part of current Government’s better 
regulation agenda. Indeed the Government is supportive of the idea. Speaking on 
behalf of the Government during the House of Lords debate on 6 June 2005, Baroness 
Amos said: 
 
Parliament and Government have a common interest in 
strengthening post legislative scrutiny. From the Government’s 
point of view, it could help to ensure that the Government’s aims 
are delivered in practice and that the considerable resources 
devoted to legislation are committed to good effect.17 
 
It may be argued that in the context of legislation emanating from the European 
Union, it is not the ‘Government’s aims’ that are at stake but nonetheless,  as will be 
demonstrated below, there are powerful reasons why post-legislative review of 
European-derived legislation is at least as desirable as that of domestic legislation, 
although the purposes and benefits may differ. 
 
 
                                                 
16 Ibid., p 13. 
17 House of Lords Hansard, 6 June 2005, vol 672, no 10, col 769. 
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PART 2: THE NATURE OF EUROPEAN LEGISLATION 
 
EU legislation comes into being in what can be called organized chaos where 
politicians and diplomats have the upper hand while lawyers have a relatively 
weak position.18 
 
The European legislative process 
The legislative process in the Community is complex and depends both on the Treaty 
under which the measure is adopted and on the provision of that Treaty applicable to 
the case in question.19 The legislative process is described in great detail in a number 
of works.20 For the purposes of this paper, it is sufficient to provide an overview of 
the roles of the Community institutions as a basis for considering the roles they might 
play in the evaluation of legislation after it has been brought into force. As Craig and 
de Búrca have noted, the distinguishing characteristic of the different legislative 
procedures is the degree of power afforded to the European Parliament.21 Decision-
making within the EU has always been characterised by the institutional balance 
between the Commission, Council and the European Parliament and it is a balance 
that is dynamic rather than static and which has changed over time.22 Most legislation 
of importance passed by the Community now is subject to the co-decision procedure 
which was introduced by the Maastricht Treaty and amended by the Amsterdam 
Treaty.23 This procedure may be summed up as follows24: A proposal is sent by the 
Commission to both the Parliament and the Council. The Parliament can propose 
amendments at the first reading of the measure. If the Council approves, the proposed 
act can be adopted at that stage. If the Council does not approve, it can adopt a 
‘common position’ which is communicated to the Parliament. The Parliament can 
subsequently agree to the common position at second reading, or not take a decision, 
                                                 
18 Sandström, G,  Guest Editorial: Knocking EU Law into Shape, 2003, Common Market Law Review, 
40, 1307 at 1307-8. 
19 Hartley, T C, (2003), ‘The Foundations of European Community Law’, 5th edition, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, p 41. 
20 Ibid., p 41 to 47; Craig, P & de Búrca, G, (2003), ‘EU Law: Text, Cases and Materials’, 3rd edition, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford, chapter 4. 
21 Craig, P & de Búrca, G, (2003), ‘EU Law: Text, Cases and Materials’, 3rd edition, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, p 139. 
22 Ibid., at p 175. 
23 Craig, P, Britain in the European Union, p 95, in Jowell, J and Oliver, D, (2004), ‘The  Changing 
Constitution’, 5th edition, Oxford University Press, Oxford, p 92. 
24 Ibid. 
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or reject the common position in which case the act will not be adopted. Alternatively, 
further amendments may be suggested for approval by the Council. If the Council 
does not approve, a meeting of the Conciliation Committee is convened during which 
equal numbers of representatives from the Council and Parliament are tasked with 
reaching an agreement on a joint text. If it is able to do so, this must then be approved 
by the Parliament and Council. The Commission has the right of legislative initiative, 
which means that it has a major influence over the development of the Community’s 
legislative agenda.  In the context of this paper, the procedure described above forms 
the backdrop to a very difficult but vital question: how on earth is one to assess the 
transformation of the original proposal, resulting from the amendments voted by the 
European Parliament and introduced after the discussions and compromises in the 
Council?25 
 
How EU legislation ends up in UK domestic law 
In order to assist with subsequent analysis, it is pertinent to include here a quick 
rundown of the main ways in which legislation emanating from the EU ends up in UK 
domestic law. The Treaty Establishing the European Community contains a number 
of provisions empowering the institutions of the Communities to make legislation of 
different kinds. The three main types of legislation are set out in Article 249 (ex 
Article 189) of that Treaty26: 
 Article 249 
In order to carry out their task and in accordance with the 
provisions of this Treaty, the European Parliament acting jointly 
with the Council, the Council and the Commission shall make 
regulations and issue directives, take decisions, make 
recommendations or deliver opinions. 
 
A regulation shall have general application. It shall be binding in 
its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States. 
 
                                                 
25 Gallas, T Gallas, T, Evaluation in EC Legislation, Statute Law Review, 2001, Volume 22, Number 2, 
pp 83 to 95, at 94 to 95. 
26 Foster, N, (2005), ‘Blackstone’s EC Legislation’, 16th  edition, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
p71.  
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A directive shall be binding, as to the result to be achieved, upon 
each Member State to which it is addressed, but shall leave to the 
national authorities the choice of form and methods. 
 
A decision shall be binding in its entirety upon those to whom it is 
addressed. 
 
Recommendations and opinions shall have no binding force. 
 
It can be see from this Article that Community regulations can be “parachuted into the 
domestic legal system without [national] parliamentary involvement”.27 On the other 
hand, the implementation of directives does require the involvement of national 
Parliaments. This distinction is directly relevant to the issue of where responsibility 
should lie for the evaluation of European-derived legislation after it has come into 
force.  The distinction also explains the use in the title of this paper of ‘legislation 
derived from the European Union’  which has been selected in order to include 
consideration of that secondary legislation which is enacted as a result of the 
obligation of member states to transpose Community directives into domestic law. It 
is the directive that is most frequently responsible for inspiring domestic 
implementing legislation.28 And as will be shown it part 3, the transposition of 
directives gives rise to particular problems. 
 
The European Communities Act 1972 was enacted by the UK Parliament to endorse 
the incorporation of Community principles into domestic law. The central plank of the 
Act is section 2(1) which provides: 
 
All such rights, powers, liabilities, obligations and restrictions 
from time to time created or arising by or under the Treaties, and 
all such remedies and procedures from time to time provided for 
by or under the Treaties, as in accordance with the Treaties are 
without further enactment to be given legal effect or used in the 
                                                 
27 Double, P,  The Impact of European Community Law on the British Legislative Process, p 77, in 
Brazier, A, (2004), ‘Parliament, Politics and Law Making: Issues and Developments in the Legislative 
Process’, Hansard Society, London 
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United Kingdom shall be recognised and available in law, and be 
enforced, allowed and followed accordingly; and the expression 
‘enforceable Community right’ and similar expressions shall be 
read as referring to one to which this subsection applies. 
 
The main way which a directive is given legal effect in the UK is by use of the broad 
power in section 2(2) of the European Communities Act 1972 which allows for the 
making of provisions: 
 
(a) for the purpose of implementing any Community obligation of 
the United Kingdom, or enabling any such obligation to be 
implemented, or of enabling any rights enjoyed or to be 
enjoyed by the United Kingdom under or by virtue of the 
Treaties to be exercised; or 
(b) for the purpose of dealing with matters arising out of or related 
to any such obligation or rights or the coming into force, or the 
operation from time to time, of subsection (1) above… 
 
This power is usually exercised by regulations made by a Minister of the Crown.29 
Greenberg has noted that despite the constitutional importance and breadth of the 
power in section 2(2) of the European Communities Act there is nothing unusual or 
specific about the form of instrument made under it which allows it to be readily 
identified  - on its face it is the same as any other set of regulations made by statutory 
instrument.30 This point has direct bearing on the issue of whether the purposes of 
post-legislative scrutiny of European-derived legislation are or should be any different 
from those in relation to purely domestic legislation. 
  
Volume of EU-derived legislation 
Before embarking upon arguments as to why and how post-legislative scrutiny of EU-
derived legislation could be improved, it is worth pausing for a moment to gauge the 
impact that EU-derived legislation has had on the UK.  Ascertaining the actual 
                                                                                                                                            
28 Greenberg, D, (2004), ‘Craies on Legislation’, 8th edition, Sweet & Maxwell, London, p 702. 
29 The other way is by Order in Council which is used if the constitutional or professional significance 
of the instrument is such as to make an Order in Council seen more appropriate – ibid., p 164. 
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volume of legislation derived from the European Union is a surprisingly elusive task. 
In a recent Parliamentary question, Lord Stevens of Ludgate asked Her Majesty’s 
Government: “How much of all United Kingdom legislation has its origins in 
European Union legislation.” The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State of State, 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Lord Triesman replied that: 
 
The UK welcomes the European Commission’s continued 
commitment to the better regulation agenda in particular it rolling 
programme to simplify existing  legislation and the withdrawal so 
far of around 70 pending proposals. The Government also 
welcomes the European Council invitation to the Commission to 
cut administrative burdens on business by 25 per cent. 
 
We estimate that around half of all legislation with an impact on 
business, charities and the voluntary sector stems from legislation 
agreed by Ministers in Brussels. Parliamentary analysis of UK 
statutory instruments implemented annually under the European 
Communities Act 1972 suggests that on average around 9 per cent 
of all statutory instruments originate in Brussels.31 
 
In 2002, the Cabinet Office had  already estimated that about half of all UK 
legislation which imposes costs on businesses, charities and the voluntary sector 
originates from the European Union.32 In July 2004, Mr Connarty MP asked a 
Parliamentary Question the purpose of which was to ascertain the evidential basis for 
this estimation and received the following answer from the Government: “The 
evidential base for this statement was an analysis of Regulatory Impact Assessments 
(RIAs), which showed that about half of measures that imposed non-negligible costs 
on business, charities and the private sector originated from the European Union.33 
Despite this confirmation from Government, the figure of 50% has been challenged as 
a distortion. Richard Corbett MEP has reported, on behalf of the European 
                                                                                                                                            
30 Greenberg, D, (2004), ‘Craies on Legislation’, 8th edition, Sweet & Maxwell, London, p 165. 
31 House of Lords Hansard, 29 June 2006, WA 183. 
32 Cabinet Office, (October 2002), Improving the way the UK handles European legislation: Pilot 
quality assurance study and transposition conference – synthesis report, p2.  
33 House of Commons Hansard, 22 July 2004, 490W. 
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Movement, that taken as a whole, the amount of UK legislation that is formed at 
European level is around 9%.34 This figure is based on a House of Commons Library 
estimate as detailed in a Written Answer to a Parliamentary Question in 2005.35  It is 
unclear but certainly unlikely that this figure includes all of the secondary legislation 
spawned by the requirement to transpose EU Directives. What is clear is that Brussels 
does produce a huge amount of material. Over a thousand European documents are 
deposited in Parliament each year.36  In terms of EU legislation, the breakdown for 
2005 was that there were 88 new Directives and 461 Regulations, totalling 5583 pages 
in the Official Journal.37 Although estimates of precisely how much UK domestic law 
now owes its origins to Europe inevitably involve a degree of empiricism, the 
influence of Europe on UK law making is now an established fact and is far more 
broad ranging than was anticipated in the parliamentary debates when the decision to 
join was made.38  
 
The quality of EU legislation 
There are a number of factors, unique to the EU context, that jeopardise the quality of 
EU legislation. A key point is that quality, per se, has not traditionally been 
considered a priority. As Dr Helen Xanthaki has observed, the main aim of EU 
drafters has been to achieve the actual passing of legislation agreed by Member States 
whose differences in interests and legal systems have rendered the procedure of 
passing legislation at the EU level a “rather lengthy and painful sequence of sensitive 
compromises”.39  Gustaf Sandström agrees that the focus on political and diplomatic 
compromises is partly to blame but also points to the “inadequate resources devoted 
to legislative drafting”.40 Other factors are that it is commonplace for the European 
Commission’s first draft of an act to be prepared by a technical expert rather than a 
                                                 
34 Corbett, R, (February 2006), European Movement Policy Paper 5, The EU – Who makes decisions? 
A guide to the process and the UK’s role, p 2.  
35 House of Commons Hansard, 22 March 2005, WA col. 796-7. 
36House of Commons Select Committee on the Modernisation of the House of Commons, 2nd  Report, 
(2004-05), Scrutiny of European Business, HC 465-I, para 4.   
37 I am grateful to Mr Charles Carey, Research Counsel, Parliamentary Counsel Office, 36 Whitehall, 
London, for providing this data, based on information from the Office for Official Publications of the 
European Communities.  
38 Double, P,  The Impact of European Community Law on the British Legislative Process, p 74, in 
Brazier, A, (2004), ‘Parliament, Politics and Law Making: Issues and Developments in the Legislative 
Process’, Hansard Society, London 
39 Xanthaki, H, The Problem of Quality in EU Legislation: What on earth is really wrong? 2001, 
Common Market Law Review, 38,  651 at 651. 
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lawyer and that no one person has responsibility for ensuring that the text as a whole 
hangs together.41 Another complicating factor, as identified by Timmermans42, results 
from the fact that each legal act must be based upon the legal base granting the 
relevant competence. Decision-making procedures often vary according to the legal 
base, making it difficult to use more than  one legal base for one act. This may cause 
legislation to be artificially split up and may therefore increase the risk of inconsistent 
and incoherent rules.   Perhaps the biggest problem is that of language. This was cited 
more frequently than any other factor during the author’s research trip to Brussels. EU 
legislation applies to 450 million people in 25 countries and exists in 20 languages 
which all have equal status, meaning that legislation is drafted in all 20 languages, 
rather than there simply being one original language version and 19 translations. The 
difficulties are compounded by the fact that due to work arrangements most drafters 
write in a foreign language.43  
 
In contrast, the UK does not have the same concerns about the drafting quality of its 
domestic legislation. Sir Edward Caldwell, former First Parliamentary Counsel, has 
identified a number of arrangements in the UK which have a bearing on the quality of 
domestic legislation: professional expert legal drafters are employed by the 
Government to draft all primary legislation and some important or complex 
subordinate legislation; the distinction between responsibility for the policy 
underlying legislation and responsibility for preparing the required legislative text is 
firmly maintained; Government legislation is prepared within the privacy of the 
government machine which tends to give those responsible for preparing it more room 
to explore solutions than might otherwise be the case; and except in the case of 
emergency legislation, the Parliamentary process is long and draft legislation is 
submitted to close scrutiny, both by the Members of each House of Parliament and by 
outside interests over many months.44 
 
                                                                                                                                            
40 Sandström, G,  Guest Editorial: Knocking EU Law into Shape, 2003, Common Market Law Review, 
40, 1307 at 1309. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Timmermans, C, How can one improve the quality of Community legislation? 1997, Common 
Market Law Review, 34, 1229 at 1233. 
43 Robinson, W, How the European Commission  drafts legislation in 20 languages, May 2005, Clarity, 
(Journal of the international association promoting plain language drafting), No. 53, p 4. 
44 Caldwell, E, Comments in Kellerman, A, et al, (1998), ‘Improving the Quality of Legislation in 
Europe’, Kluwer, The Hague, pp 79 to 83 at 80. 
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The differing aims of post-legislative scrutiny in the domestic and EU context  
The marked contrast in quality of UK legislation and EU legislation has implications 
for the purposes of post-legislative scrutiny of both. Professor Mader’s legislative 
methodology45 is clearly relevant in both contexts.  In terms of the evaluation of UK 
domestic legislation in the UK, there has been no question and arguably no need for 
an evaluation of the quality of drafting, rather the focus, as we have seen, is whether 
the legislation is working in practice as intended.46 However, in the EU context, due 
to the challenges of achieving good quality legislation, evaluation may be seen to 
have a broader purpose, in also assessing the drafting quality of legislation as well as 
its practical operation. This analysis roughly equates to the identification by Jean-
Claude Piris of  two aspects of the quality of Community legislation.47 The first aspect 
concerns the substance of the law, which relates to legislative policy and the second 
aspect is the form of legislation which concerns the quality of legislative drafting and 
accessibility. Using these terms, it is arguable that post-legislative scrutiny of EU 
legislation should concern substance and form whereas the emphasis of post-
legislative of UK legislation is predominantly on substance. At the intersection,  a 
further dimension is that of the particular challenges relating to UK domestic scrutiny 
of legislation derived from the EU, which is prepared at EU level and then 
implemented at domestic level. The scrutiny challenge of this type of legislation is 
considered next in Part 3. 
 
 
                                                 
45 See p 7 above. 
46 See p 10 above. 
47 Piris, J-C, The Quality of Community Legislation: The Viewpoint of the Council Legal Service 
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PART 3: UK SCRUTINY OF EU-DERIVED LEGISLATION 
 
Given the gargantuan size of their task, the [European scrutiny committees of the UK 
Parliament] do a sterling job, but their work is often not given the attention it 
deserves, either in Parliament or further afield.48 
 
Early responses to the scrutiny challenge of the ‘new legal order’ 
In order to understand the adequacy of scrutiny at domestic level, it is helpful to 
consider briefly the reaction of the UK Parliament to the challenges presented by the 
‘new legal order’ brought in by membership of the European Economic Community. 
In 1963, the European Court of Justice ruled that the European Community, through 
the express will of Member States in the Treaty of Rome, "constitutes a new legal 
order of international law for the benefit of which the states have limited their 
sovereign rights albeit within limited fields and the subjects of which comprise not 
only the Member States but also their nationals”.49 The United Kingdom entered into 
the European Economic Community on 1 January 1973. Interestingly, neither the 
Treaty of Accession nor the European Communities Bill made any mention of 
Parliamentary scrutiny of European legislation. One reason cited for this is that the 
constitutional basis of the EEC and the evolution of its institutions from 1957 to 1972 
were alien to the United Kingdom.50  However, the ‘new legal order’ meant that “for 
the first time a substantial volume of legislation effective in the United Kingdom is 
now adopted by a process in which Parliament appears to have no indispensable 
constitutional role”.51 As a cautious approach to procedural innovation has always 
been a powerful British parliamentary tradition52, it is perhaps unsurprising that it was 
only after the European Communities Act 1972 became law that each House of 
                                                 
48 Jones,  Sir D, (2005) UK Parliamentary Scrutiny of EU Legislation, The Foreign Policy Centre,  
London, p 3. Available at http://fpc.org.uk/fsblob/432.pdf (last visited 5 September 2006). 
49 Case 26/62 Algemene Transport-en Expedite Ondernemin  van Gend en Loos NV v Nederlandse 
Belastingadministratie [1963] ECR 1. 
50 Blackburn, R & Kennon, A, (2003), ‘Griffith & Ryle on Parliament: Functions, Practice and 
Procedures’, 2nd edition, Sweet & Maxwell, London, p 646. 
51 Bates, T.St.John N, The Scrutiny of European Secondary Legislation at Westminster (1975-76) 1 
European Law Review 22. 
52 Ibid., at p24. 
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Parliament appointed separate select committees to suggest procedures for 
parliamentary scrutiny.53  
 
By 1974, special committees had been set up by both Houses of Parliament.54 These 
provided a means of scrutinising EC activity. However, as Professor the Lord Norton 
of Louth has observed, Parliament was developing the means to engage in a form of 
pre-legislative scrutiny.55  This differed from our current UK understanding of pre-
legislative scrutiny56 in that the UK Parliament was operating at one remove from the 
actual decision-makers and furthermore, there was nothing beyond the pre-legislative 
stage – there was no legislative stage for the UK Parliament and it was not called 
upon to give its assent to measures promulgated by Community institutions.57 This 
observation may beg the question that if there is no formal legislative stage for which 
national Parliaments are responsible, can there and should there be a post-legislative 
stage? This question will be addressed below, but first it is necessary to assess the 
scrutiny that is currently undertaken by the UK Parliament.58 
 
Pre-legislative scrutiny of EU-derived legislation 
The main purpose of the scrutiny system in the House of Commons is to ensure that 
the House of Commons has the opportunity to seek to influence UK Ministers on EU 
proposals and to hold UK Ministers to account for their activities in the Council of 
Ministers. It is only UK Ministers who are directly accountable to the House of 
Commons; none of the institutions of the European Union, not even the Council of 
Ministers collectively, is answerable to any national parliament.59 In the House of 
Commons, scrutiny work of EU documents is now undertaken by the European 
Scrutiny Committee, the remit of which is to “assess the legal and/or political 
importance of each EU document, decide which EU documents are debated, monitor 
                                                 
53 Blackburn, R & Kennon, A, (2003), ‘Griffith & Ryle on Parliament: Functions, Practice and 
Procedures’, 2nd edition, Sweet & Maxwell, London, p 647. 
54 Bradley A W & Ewing K D, (2003) ‘Constitutional and Administrative Law’, 13th edition, Longman, 
Harlow, England, p 138. 
55 Norton, P, (2005), ‘Parliament in British Politics’, Palgrave Macmillan, London, p 139. 
56 See above at p X of this paper. 
57 Norton, P, (2005), ‘Parliament in British Politics’, Palgrave Macmillan, London, p 139. 
58 For a historical analysis of the scrutiny methods adopted by Parliament between 1972 and 1993, see 
Denza, E, Parliamentary Scrutiny of Community Legislation (1993) 14 Statute Law Review 56. 
59 Department of the Clerk of the House, (June 2005), The European Scrutiny System in the House of 
Commons. A short guide for Members of Parliament by the staff of the European Scrutiny Committee, 
p 12. Available at http://www.parliament.uk/documents/upload/TheEuroScrutinySystemintheHoC.pdf 
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the activities of UK Ministers in the Council, and keep legal, procedural and 
institutional developments in the EU under review”.60 In practical terms, this involves 
the analysis of all 1,000 or so documents that are deposited in the UK Parliament each 
year.61 Originally, the Scrutiny Committee considered legislative proposals from the 
European Commission, but the wide ambit of ‘documents’ in its terms of reference 
also includes consultation papers, proposed common positions and joint actions under 
the second and third pillars of the EU, the draft of the annual budget and related 
matters.62 An Explanatory Memorandum, signed by a Government Minister, 
accompanies each document and sets out the Government’s policy on the document 
and its impact on the UK. Objectively, the system provides for wide coverage, rapid 
scrutiny where necessary and a published analysis of all documents found to be of 
legal and political importance.63 Documents can be referred for further consideration 
by one of the three European Standing Committees in the House of Commons. The 
format of these Committees allows for the questioning of the responsible Minister and 
debate and attendance (but not voting) is allowed by any Member of the House of 
Commons.64 
 
A different scrutiny system exists in the House of Lords. The formal terms of 
reference of the House of Lords European Union Select Committee are "to consider 
European Union documents and other matters relating to the European Union".65 The 
EU Committee consists of a single Select Committee and 7 Sub-Committees which 
deal with specific EU policy areas. The Chairman of the Select Committee conducts a 
weekly ‘sift’ of all of the EU documents deposited in Parliament and decides which 
should be referred to the sub-committees. About a quarter of all the EU documents are 
                                                                                                                                            
 (last visited 2 September 2006). 
60 From the homepage of the European Scrutiny Committee: 
http://www.parliament.uk/parliamentary_committees/european_scrutiny.cfm (last visited 2 September 
2006). 
61 House of Commons Select Committee on the Modernisation of the House of Commons, 2nd  Report, 
(2004-05), Scrutiny of European Business, HC 465-I, para 4.   
62 Norton, P, (2005), ‘Parliament in British Politics’, Palgrave Macmillan, London, p 140. 
63 Ibid., para 20. 
64 Department of the Clerk of the House, (June 2005), The European Scrutiny System in the House of 
Commons. A short guide for Members of Parliament by the staff of the European Scrutiny Committee, 
p 4. Available at http://www.parliament.uk/documents/upload/TheEuroScrutinySystemintheHoC.pdf 
 (last visited 2 September 2006). 
65 From the homepage of the House of Lords European Union Select Committee: 
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September 2006). 
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referred to the sub-committees.66 The sub-committee may simply take note of the 
document, or may conduct a more substantial enquiry and draft a report or write 
letters to Ministers. The House of Lords system therefore allows for more detailed 
scrutiny of selected documents. The different working methods in the two Houses 
means that their scrutiny systems are “complementary rather than competing”.67 
 
The scrutiny systems in both Houses of Parliament are underpinned by  the Scrutiny  
Reserve Resolution. Although it existed in earlier forms, the current text was agreed 
in 1998. It is intended to ensure that Ministers do not agree to EU legislation in 
Council unless the scrutiny work of the committees is complete.68 
 
It is pertinent to question the value of these procedures. Writing in 1993, Denza 
thought that the value of the scrutiny process is in part that it forces those with more 
direct power to consider their positions and their arguments carefully and to defend 
them in the face of public questioning by a committee whose members may have long 
experience of the subject-matter involved.69 Other commentators have expressed 
greater cynicism. Writing ten years later, Bradley and Ewing wrote that while the 
procedures no doubt ensure that at least some Parliamentarians are well informed 
about European issues, “in no sense do they provide effective scrutiny of EC 
legislation”.70 Bradley and Ewing then proceed to draw on the comments of the House 
of Commons Procedure Committee which they imply were as relevant in 2003 as in 
1978 when they were first published: 
  
The ability of the House to influence the legislative decisions of 
the Communities is inhibited by practical as well as legal and 
procedural obstacles. The practical obstacles stem from the  sheer 
volume of EEC legislation, the complexity of the Community’s 
                                                 
66 House of Lords Select Committee on the European Union, 1st Report, (2002-03), Review of Scrutiny 
of European Legislation,  HL Paper 15, p 11. 
67 Department of the Clerk of the House, (June 2005), The European Scrutiny System in the House of 
Commons. A short guide for Members of Parliament by the staff of the European Scrutiny Committee, 
p 4. Available at http://www.parliament.uk/documents/upload/TheEuroScrutinySystemintheHoC.pdf 
 (last visited 2 September 2006). 
68 House of Lords Select Committee on the European Union, 1st Report, (2002-03), Review of Scrutiny 
of European Legislation,  HL Paper 15, p 10.  
69 Denza, E, Parliamentary Scrutiny of Community Legislation (1993) 14 Statute Law Review 56 at 62. 
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own decision-making structure, and the very limited time available 
for the consideration of many of the proposals, including some of 
the most important. The legal and procedural obstacles include the 
fact that national parliaments have no right to be consulted, and the 
absence of direct control by national parliaments over legislation 
made by the Commission on its own authority. Moreover, the 
collective nature of decisions by the Council of Ministers 
necessarily weakens the responsibilities of the Government to 
Parliament for Council decisions to which they assent.71 
 
Another problem with the scrutiny system is that “MPs are not overly eager to take on 
such unglamorous work and those who do participate in the standing committees are 
often extreme partisans on one side or the other of the domestic European debate”.72 
This view is confirmed by a former Leader of the House of Commons, Peter Hain, 
who stated in 2004 that: 
 
…the sad fact is that European Scrutiny is something of a minority 
interest: the great majority of Members take little interest in the 
reports of the European Scrutiny Committee or in the debates 
which it recommends. Meetings of the European Standing 
Committee…are badly attended and seen to be irrelevant. 
European issues are seen as something separate and avoidable, 
while they should be in the mainstream of our political life…There 
is a worrying and widening gap between our citizens and the 
institutions of the European Union; and this is not good for our 
democracy.73 
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Longman, Harlow, England, p 138. 
71 HC SO 119 as cited ibid. 
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73 House of Commons Select Committee on the Modernisation of the House of Commons, (2003-04), 
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There is general consensus among scholars and observers alike that the European 
Union has weakened national parliaments.74 The UK Parliament is not alone in facing 
the scrutiny challenge of the new legal order. It is clear that due to the voluminous 
number of draft legal acts from Brussels, members of national parliamentary 
committees are only able to take a selective approach, thus rendering national 
parliaments “reactive institutions” in the EU legislative process.75 However, in 
comparison with other member states, it has been contended that the UK Parliament’s 
system of scrutinising EU business is one of the most effective.76 The so-called 
‘Nordic Model’ is also often cited as providing a particularly thorough degree of 
scrutiny of EU matters. This was considered by the House of Commons European 
Scrutiny Committee. In Denmark, Finland and Sweden, the Parliaments all mandate 
their Governments to conduct negotiations in the Council, reflecting a consensual 
style of policy making.77  
 
Post-legislative scrutiny of EU-derived legislation 
At this juncture, the reader could be forgiven for wondering what hope there is for 
post-legislative scrutiny of EU legislation, against the backdrop of limitations 
highlighted at the pre-legislative stage and the non-existence of a legislative stage in 
the domestic context. However, those very factors strengthen the arguments in favour 
of national review of EU derived legislation. 
 
Lord Grenfell, Chairman of the House of Lords European Union Committee gave 
written evidence on behalf of his committee to the House of Lords Constitution 
Committee for its report, Parliament and the Legislative Process. He noted that: 
 
As far as post-legislative scrutiny is concerned, the closest we 
come to this is when we call Ministers to account after they have 
                                                 
74 Duina, F & Oliver, M, National Parliaments in the European Union: Are There Any Benefits to 
Integration? European Law Journal, Vol. 11, No.2, March 2005, 173-195, at 173. The authors of that 
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75 Maurer, A et al, National Systems’ Adaption to the EU System: Trends, Offers and Constraints, p 73,  
in Kohler-Koch, B, (2003), ‘ Linking EU and National Governance’, 1st edition, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford. 
76 Hansard Society Briefing Paper, Issues in Law Making, 8: Scrutiny of European Union Business, 
(February 2006), p 4. 
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agreed measures in the Council. I should perhaps only comment 
here that it must be a key theme of any post-legislative scrutiny… 
that  one of its primary purposes be to hold Ministers to account 
for the success of their legislative and other initiatives.78 
 
Some of the inquiry work of parliamentary committees at Westminster does cover the 
implementation of legislation derived from the European Union. For example, the 
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Committees has considered the transposition of 
the End of Life Vehicles Directive and the Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment 
Directive and the implementation CAP reform in the UK. However, there is not very 
much to examine in this section as overall, it may be observed that there is very little 
UK parliamentary post-legislative scrutiny of legislation derived from the EU, 
although it may be argued that the need is great, particularly with regard to 
instruments that transpose Directives. 
 
Transposition of EU Directives into UK law 
The transposition of EU Directives into domestic law poses particular problems for 
Member States including the UK. It has been observed by Timmermans that with 
regard to Directives, “sometimes the Community legislator deliberately uses vague 
notions (or vague definitions) in order to allow for a large variety of solutions existing 
in Member States for which harmonization was not deemed necessary”.79  
Conversely, Craig and de Búrca argue that Directives are not vague and that the ends 
which Member State have to meet will be set out in considerable detail.80 Some may 
hold the view that precise wording is not so important since a Directive has to be 
transposed at the national level, but the stronger, refuting argument is that this 
proposition “disregards the fact that national law must be interpreted in conformity 
with the directive, which will in any event often take precedence by virtue of the 
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principle of direct effect.”81 Directives, in contrast to Regulations, require particular 
attention by national authorities as they merely set aims allowing national authorities 
to exercise their autonomy in the process of implementation; however the autonomy is 
not boundless and national authorities must ensure full application in fact and law.82 It 
is also worth recalling that the European Court of Justice has held that Directives have 
direct effect, enabling individuals to rely on them in actions against the State and that 
a Member State can be liable in damages for non-implementation of a directive.83 
 
In 2003 Robin Bellis prepared a report on the implementation of EU legislation and 
compared approaches to transposition of Directives by the UK, France, Spain and 
Sweden.84 He noted that all Member States had problems from time to time with 
transposition. However, he found that while France, Spain and Sweden were inclined 
to copy out the provisions of the Directive into domestic law, without modification, 
the UK was more prone to elaboration of the provisions of the Directive.85 The British 
media has picked up on this phenomenon of over-implementation by the UK, citing 
examples such as the 12 page Abattoirs Directive which the UK Government 
transformed into 96 pages of implementing regulations while the French were able to 
do it in seven.86 The Financial Times also reported recently that small businesses in 
the UK are adversely affected by the overuse of EU rules.87 In its report on the 
scrutiny of European business, the House of Commons Modernisation Committee 
considered the criticism often levied against the UK, that it is over-zealous in its 
transposition of EU Directives into domestic law.88 In his evidence to the 
Modernisation Committee for this inquiry, Chris Huhn MEP summed up the 
complaint of elaboration or “gold-plating” as follows: “During [the transposition] 
process, it is quite possible for [Government] departments to hang all sorts of 
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decorations onto the Christmas tree before it arrives as a statutory instrument.”89 As 
Robin Bellis noted, this is sometimes deliberately as a matter of policy and in the 
“spirit of helpfulness – to make the scope of the rights conferred clear or preserve the 
integrity of the statute book”90 However, Bellis argues that the negative side is that 
elaboration of Directives is unhelpful and misleading and can give false comfort to 
those affected when the elaboration can be set aside by courts in implementing the 
direct effect of the Directive provision.91  
 
In order to help address the problem of over-implementation, the Cabinet Office in 
2005 published a Transposition Guide for use by Government departments. It states 
that: “It is Government policy not to go beyond the minimum requirements of 
European directives, unless there are exceptional circumstances, justified by a cost-
benefit analysis and extensive consultation with stakeholders.”92 In 2003, the House 
of Lords Select Committee on the Merits of Statutory Instruments was set up to 
consider every statutory instrument which is laid before each House of Parliament. 
The Committee can decide whether to draw special attention of the House to a 
particular instrument on a number of grounds including whether the instrument, 
“inappropriately implements European Union legislation”.93 The Committee argued 
that the  Horse Passports (England) Regulations 2004 fell into this category.94 They 
were introduced to implement a Directive intended to protect the human food chain 
and the trade in pedigree horses. The regulations were drafted in such a way as to 
require 800,000 horses to be issued with passports, whereas the total number that 
actually fell into the categories to be protected, the Committee argued, was more like 
210,000. The Minister argued that the regulations did not in fact go beyond the 
requirements of the relevant Directive and the domestic regulations are now in force. 
This example brings home very keenly, it is argued, the case for looking back to see 
whether in fact the method of implementation by the UK has proved to be more 
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burdensome than originally intended by the framers of the Directive and if so, what 
lessons can be drawn for future implementation. There is an evaluation gap here as 
such review is not routinely undertaken, although it would certainly be beneficial.  
 
As noted above95, there is nothing unusual or specific about the form of instrument 
usually used to transpose Directives into UK domestic law; on their face they are the 
same as any other set of regulations made by statutory instrument. It therefore right to 
question whether any different considerations should come into play when making the 
case for post-legislative scrutiny of legislation derived from the EU, as against  
domestically derived legislation. Lord Filkin, Chairman of the House of Lords Select 
Committee on the Merits of Statutory Instruments has shed light on the distinction: 
 
…there is a significant difference between our ability to have 
purchase on statutory instruments that originate from EU 
legislation compared to those that originate from the UK 
Parliament. In the latter case, it is conceivable that, in the light of 
our scrutiny, Departments could make significant changes to the 
ways in which they implement regulation emanating from statute. 
In the case of EU-originating legislation, the purchase of the Lords 
or the UK Parliament is much more limited.96 
 
Although the Merits Committee is concerned with the scrutiny of legislation at the 
pre-legislative stage, the relevance of this distinction can be extrapolated to the post-
legislative stage and serves to highlight the particular importance of undertaking post-
legislative scrutiny of EU derived legislation. 
 
In the latest acknowledgement of the need to address the problems associated with the 
transposition of Directives, the Government has commissioned an evaluative project 
which is currently being undertaken and which is headed by the former Solicitor 
General for Scotland, Lord Davidson QC. The Davidson Review is scrutinising areas 
of existing EU-derived legislation for evidence of over-implementation in the UK and 
                                                 
95 See p 15 above. 
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aims to support the productivity of the UK economy by ensuring that EU legislation 
has not been implemented in a way that results in unnecessary regulatory burdens.97 
The review is supported by the Better Regulation Executive within Cabinet Office and 
early in 2006, called for evidence of ‘over-implementation’ of EU legislation. In July 
2006, an interim report summarising the responses to the call for evidence was 
published.98 The report explains that over-implementation is a broad term that 
encompasses not just gold plating but also double banking and regulatory creep:99 
Double banking is where European legislation covers similar ground to that of 
existing UK legislation but where the two regimes have not been fully streamlined in 
the implementation process to consolidate all linked instruments, aims, objectives, 
obligations and enforcement mechanisms to make them simple and consistent with 
each other. Regulatory creep is where requirements imposed by the regulator are 
unclear,  more stringent that their equivalents in the implementing legislation or 
where there is confusion as to their legal status and hence the necessity for those 
regulated to comply with them. Arguably the Davidson Review itself may be seen as 
a form of post-legislative scrutiny. As the interim report notes, “the critical issue is 
whether or not the UK has implemented European legislation effectively and in the 
least burdensome way possible for achieving its objectives”.100 The review is a 
welcome development and it may be that when the final report is published, it will 
provide a framework or at least guidance for the way in which the UK implementation 
of EU legislation can be monitored in a more systematic way.  
 
Evaluation as part of better regulation 
In 1997, the Better Regulation Task Force101 was set up as an independent body to 
advise the Government on action to ensure that regulation and its enforcement accord 
with the five principles of good regulation: proportionality, accountability, 
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consistency, transparency and targeting.102 In March 2005, the Better Regulation Task 
Force published 'Regulation - Less is More' which recommended radical reforms 
aimed at reducing regulatory burdens. The Report described one of the important 
changes that the Government needed to make to the existing machinery for managing 
its regulatory programme as follows: 
 
Departments and regulators should undertake more frequent and 
better post-implementation reviews of regulation, including 
reviews of how the UK has implemented EU law. Such reviews 
should assess whether the measure is working as expected, whether 
the costs and benefits are as predicted, whether there have been 
unintended consequences and whether there is scope for 
simplification. The results of these reviews should feed into future 
policy making and simplification proposals.103 
 
This sensible reasoning clearly demonstrates one way in which evaluation can be seen 
as a part of better regulation. The fact that evaluation is recognised as part of better 
regulation is a positive development for the potential of post-legislative scrutiny of 
legislation derived from the EU. This is because the concept of better regulation 
enjoys broad support from the Government.104 This is evidenced by the acceptance by 
the Government105 of all of the recommendations made by the Better Regulation Task 
Force in its Report, including Recommendation 3, which was based on the reasoning 
above: 
The Task Force recommends that, by September 2006, all 
departments, in consultation with stakeholders, should develop a 
rolling programme of simplification to identify regulations that can 
be simplified, repealed, reformed and/or consolidated. The 
simplification programmes should include: 
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• proposals to reduce administrative burdens, 
• revisiting the implementation of EU directives, particularly 
framework directives. 
 Departments should undertake post-implementation reviews of all 
major pieces of legislation, the results of which should feed into 
their rolling simplification programme… 
 
In accepting this recommendation, the Government added that, “when undertaking a 
post implementation review, departments should consider the scope for simplification, 
including revisiting EU Directives as part of the European programme of 
simplification where relevant”.106  The last part of this sentence indicates a very 
welcome willingness to connect with better regulation initiatives at the EU level, 
which are considered in Part 4 of this paper.  
 
 
The link between impact assessment and evaluation 
It is important to consider the extent to which Government departments (as opposed 
to Parliament) are already obliged to undertake post-legislative review of legislation 
derived from the European Union. The role of  regulatory impact assessments, (RIAs) 
provides the key to this analysis. RIAs were introduced in 1998 in an effort to prevent 
unintended and unwanted outcomes and are required for any proposed UK or EU 
legislation that “has an impact on businesses, charities or voluntary bodies” and about 
160 RIAs are issued by Government departments each year.107 The Cabinet Office 
Better Regulation Executive Guidance on RIAs108 recommends that RIAs should 
address post-implementation review; the purpose of such a review is described as 
being to establish “whether implemented regulations are having the intended effect 
and whether they are implementing policy objectives efficiently. The [review] is not 
intended to review the effects of the policy itself or to determine whether the intended 
policy is still desirable”.109 It is worth noting three points in relation to RIAs. First, 
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that the primary purpose of the RIA is to provide “a framework for analysis of the 
likely impacts of a policy change and the range of options for implementing it”.110 
Second, the RIA is not updated to reflect changes that may be made during the 
legislative process, including amendments to Bills. The RIA is, as Robert Baldwin has 
described, “ a pre-implementation tool”.111 Third, the RIA is governed by guidance 
only, which is not followed in every case. This last point is confirmed by the National 
Audit Office which monitors the quality of RIAs and reported recently that from its 
sample of ten RIAs, six did not give any details of monitoring and evaluation 
procedures.112 Despite these limitations, the potential usefulness of the RIA procedure 
in relation to post-legislative scrutiny should not be underestimated. This potential is 
slowly becoming recognised.  
 
In its most recently published evaluative report on RIAs113, the National Audit Office 
found, once again, that monitoring and evaluation are “often tackled poorly” and 
stated that: “Robust monitoring and evaluation strategies will help departments to 
identify those regulations which are effective, those that need to be adjusted, and 
those which can be removed without compromising benefits”.114 The National Audit 
Office report also addressed the use of ex post evaluation and stated that Government 
departments had concentrated on ex-ante impact assessment, with limited efforts to 
evaluate the impact of legislation after it comes into force, and concluded that: 
“Departments do not, therefore, have sufficient oversight of whether their regulations 
are delivering the intended impacts and there is no systematic feedback on the 
robustness of the assumptions used in the RIA”.115  However, as Robert Baldwin has 
observed, “it is arguable that the RIA is seen as the key regulatory tool by the UK 
Government, the European Union and the OECD”.116 In making the link between 
evaluation and better regulation, Baldwin goes on to conclude that, “advancing 
towards smarter regulation may require… a new emphasis on post-implementation 
review and adjustment”, however he warns that: “In multi-actor, multi-strategy 
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networks of regulation…the tools of such evaluation and adjustment will have to be 
used with an awareness of their limitations – an awareness that is not less than should 
be applied to pre-implementation tools such as the RIA”.117 
 
The evaluation gap 
The analysis in this part has shown that while there is a growing awareness of the 
need for post-legislative scrutiny of legislation derived from the EU, there is not yet 
much evidence of this taking place in practice. There is an evaluation gap which falls 
at the post-implementation stage, which means that the reiterative learning as 
described by Professor Mader in his legislative methodology cannot take place 
effectively. However, the realisation of evaluation as a critical part of better regulation 
is in itself a positive development and the growing culture of impact assessment 
represents a step in the right direction in terms of evaluation.  The next question is 
how much of the responsibility for evaluation of EU legislation should be assumed at 
EU level, by the Community institutions themselves. This is considered next in part 4. 
 
 
 
                                                 
117 Ibid., at 511. 
 34
 PART 4: POST-LEGISLATIVE SCRUTINY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 
 
 
At European level thought should be given on how to insert monitoring into all stages 
of the law-making process. However, the first step is for all of the authorities 
concerned to become aware of the problem.118 
 
 
The journey towards recognition of evaluation as part of better regulation in the 
European Union 
The Lisbon Agenda was formulated  in 2000 when the EU “set itself a new strategic 
goal for the next decade: to become the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-
based economy in the world”.119 Although the concept of better regulation was not 
specifically mentioned in the Presidency Conclusions, the Lisbon Agenda in requiring 
an optimal regulatory environment in order to achieve its macroeconomic goals and 
social objectives, gave rise to the better regulation initiative.120  By the end of 2001, 
the Mandelkern Group on Better Regulation had published their final report.121 The 
Report identified better regulation as “a drive to improve the policymaking process 
through the integrated use of effective tools” and made recommendations in seven key 
areas: “policy implementation options, impact assessment, consultation, 
simplification, access to regulation, structures and implementation of European 
regulation”. 122 Although, perhaps surprisingly, evaluation did not feature as a “key 
area” in the Report, the Group were asked to make proposals on specifying a common 
method for evaluating the quality of regulation. The Group declined to do so, 
considering that, although examining policy implementation options, performing 
regulatory impact assessment and conducting consultation formed a common method 
of ex ante evaluation, it is “currently not possible to extend this to ex post evaluation 
given the great differences in national structures, legal systems and institutional 
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arrangements”.123 However, the Group did give some guidance and stated that, when 
done well, ex post evaluation “provides clear information on the effectiveness and 
appropriateness of the regulation, disclosing weaknesses and other shortages, enabling 
the review to decide what action, if any, to take”.124  Ex post evaluation, the Report 
went on to suggest, could be carried out in the context of a simplification programme, 
or when new regulation is being prepared.  It is clear that evaluation, per se, was not 
given high priority in the Report. It reflects a tendency at EU level to sideline 
evaluation, rather than treat it as a desirable contribution to better regulation and 
better legislation in its own right. This approach can be seen again in the 2003 
Interinstitutional Agreement on Better Lawmaking in which the European Parliament, 
the Council and the Commission agreed to improve the quality of law-making by 
means of a series of initiatives and procedures.125 Under the heading of “Improving 
the quality of legislation”, the Agreement states that: 
 
The three Institutions, exercising their respective powers, will 
ensure that legislation is of good quality, namely that it is clear, 
simple and effective. The Institutions consider that improvements 
of the pre-legislative consultation process and more frequent use of 
impact assessments (both ex ante and ex post) will help towards 
this objective.126 
 
This statement discloses an ambiguity - it is not clear whether the reference to ex post 
assessment is intended to refer to evaluation of the legislation or to evaluation of the 
ex ante impact assessment. Assuming it is the former, the statement provides a link 
between evaluation and the quality of legislation, in the sense of its substance – 
whether it is effective, and its form – whether it is clear and simple. The link was 
spelled out more explicitly by the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) 
in its report on better implementation of EU legislation127, an own-initiative opinion 
in which the Committee stated that: “The EESC considers implementation and 
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enforcement of legislation to be inextricable elements of better lawmaking and 
therefore a political priority…screening of existing and already implemented EU law 
will be helpful in the process of better lawmaking. This is an illustrative example of 
the interaction between simplification and improving implementation and 
enforcement”.128 Importantly, the McCarthy Report on implementation has very 
recently noted that: “Better regulation for the Internal Market is about ensuring good 
quality, effective legislation, which does not stifle innovation and lead to unnecessary 
burden and costs, in particular for SMEs, public authorities or voluntary groups”.129 
The McCarthy Report was followed up by the Frassoni Report130,  which noted that  
the correct and swift implementation of European legislation is an integral and 
essential part of better regulation. However, that Report also acknowledges that the 
quality of legislation and the clarity of obligations for Member States is often not 
satisfactory owing to fact that legislation is often the result of difficult political 
compromises.131 This echoes the particular scrutiny challenges that arise in relation to 
European legislation as discussed in part 2 of this paper.  
 
These developments show how the concepts of better lawmaking, better regulation 
and evaluation have been interwoven by different contributions to the debate. The 
European Policy Forum has noted that although better regulation has been recognised 
as an important part of the Lisbon Agenda, “there are signs that it has become more a 
fashionable and popular buzzword that goes down well with the general public and 
with business than a genuine concept which is being vigorously implemented”.132  
The underlying reason for this observation may be that ‘better regulation’ as a concept 
lacks a universal definition and therefore acts as umbrella term to cover a myriad of 
initiatives (which are often broad concepts themselves) including deregulation, 
improving the regulatory environment, reducing administrative burdens, cutting costs 
for business, improving the quality of impact assessment, improving transparency in 
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decision-making and accessibility to regulation, improving the quality of legislation, 
reducing the quantity of legislation and simplification. The explosion in initiatives in 
these areas means it is difficult to cut through them and discover what action is 
actually being taken, by whom and how effectively. Many initiatives are still at the 
ideas stage. 
 
Simplification 
The value of evaluation work has been recognised most clearly in the context of 
simplification, which is an important aspect of better regulation, and which has a 
relatively long history in the European Union. For example, in 1996, the SLIM 
initiative (Simpler Legislation for the Internal Market) aimed to identify ways in 
which Community and national legislation could be simplified.133 Simplification in 
itself necessitates a form of post-legislative scrutiny as existing legislation is 
reviewed.  This concept was recognised in a Commission Communication in 2005  on 
a strategy for the simplification of the regulatory environment which stated that: “The 
Commission will exercise its right of initiative to design proposals for simplification. 
In conformity with better regulation practices, this will entail thorough ex post 
evaluations and in-depth stakeholder consultation and careful assessment of various 
options to demonstrate the added value of proposed measures in relation to growth 
and jobs”.134  This form of post-legislative scrutiny has a particular purpose as it will 
initially be a screening exercise for the potential to simplify particular acts rather than 
a form of systematic evaluation to assess the effectiveness of the legislation in 
practice. As a result of the screening of 42 policy sectors, the Commission has already 
identified more than 200 legal acts with a potential for simplification and has adopted 
more than 35 initiatives with simplification implications.135 During an interview with 
Mr Lars Mitek-Pedersen, Head of the Better Regulation and Impact Assessment Unit, 
Commission Secretariat General136, Mr Mitek-Pedersen emphasised that 
simplification initiatives should be based on a real need faced by users of the 
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legislation, and that the exercise should be informed by input from stakeholders. In 
assessing legislation suitable for simplification, he explained that it is difficult to 
come up with uniform criteria but administrative costs imposed by legislation are 
increasingly perceived as a critical factor. The process of simplification, he said, 
requires a flexible and creative approach. The aims of simplification are laudable. 
Once suitable measures for simplification have been identified, the Commission can 
pursue simplification methods such as repeal, codification, recasting (amending and 
codifying legal acts) and modification of the regulatory approach.137  However, 
simplification is often linked with the drives towards improving the form of 
legislation and therefore the emphasis is not on the evaluation of the substance of the 
legislation in practice. However, the outcomes of simplification may also be triggered 
in the context of post-legislative scrutiny, the purpose of which is to measure the 
effectiveness of legislation after it has been brought into force. 
 
Tools for Evaluation 
If there is to be a more systematic way of scrutinising EU legislation after it has been 
brought into force, it is wise to consider the existing tools available for evaluation and 
whether there is potential for their role to be enhanced. 
 
Review clauses 
Some Directives contain review clauses which means that a mechanism for post-
legislative scrutiny is built into the legislation itself. One example is Article 33 of 
Directive 95/46 EC on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of 
personal data. Article 33 provides that: 
 
The Commission shall report to the Council and the European 
Parliament at regular intervals, starting not later than three years 
after the date referred to in Article 32(1), on the implementation of 
this Directive, attaching to its report, if necessary, suitable 
proposals for amendments. This report shall be made public. 
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The Commission shall examine, in particular, the application of 
this Directive to the data processing  of sound and image data 
relating to natural persons and shall submit any appropriate 
proposals which prove to be necessary, taking account of 
developments in information technology and in the light of the 
state of progress in the information society. 
 
A joint proposal for the amendment of this Directive was prepared by Austria, 
Finland, Sweden and the United Kingdom.138  The UK Government also responded to 
a questionnaire from the Commission.139 Furthermore, in September 2000, some six 
months after the Data Protection Act 1998 (based on the Directive) came into force, 
the UK Home Office carried out a public consultation exercise to help it make an 
early appraisal of the Act's impact. The first Commission report highlighted the 
various issues raised by Member States but suggested that these could be involved by 
better implementation of the Directive rather than requiring amendments to the 
Directive itself.140 Subsequently, the Commission forwarded its Report to Parliament 
and it was referred to the Committee on Citizens' Freedoms and Rights, Justice and 
Home Affairs for information. That Committee was then authorised by the President 
of the Parliament to draw up an own-initiative report on the subject, which resulted in 
the adoption of a draft resolution.141 
 
The data protection Directive provides a good example of the operation of a review 
clause, in that there was subsequent follow-up by the European Parliament and the 
UK Government also took it upon itself to evaluate implementation. However, it is 
important to recognise the limitations of review clauses in Directives. During an 
interview with Mr Robert Bray, Legal Administrator to the Legal Affairs Committee 
of the European Parliament142, Mr Bray  pointed out that where a review clause in a 
                                                 
138 Data Protection Directive (95/46/EC) Proposals for Amendment made by Austria, Finland, Sweden 
and the United Kingdom Explanatory Note (September 2002), available at 
http://www.dca.gov.uk/ccpd/dpdamend.htm (last visited 9 September 2006). 
139 http://www.dca.gov.uk/ccpd/saguide.htm (last visited 9 September 2006). 
140 Report from the Commission - First Report on the implementation of the Data Protection Directive 
(95/46/EC) COM (2003) 265 final, 15 May 2003, p 7. 
141 European Parliament Report on the First Report  on the implementation of the Data Protection 
Directive (95/46/EC), final A5-0104/2004, 24 February 2004. 
142 Interview carried out by the author at the European Parliament in Brussels on Thursday 7 September 
2006. 
 40
Directive is not complied with, Parliament will react but sometimes reviews are 
carried out in compliance with the review clause but then not taken up.  Mr Bray said 
that committees in Parliament are able to produce own-initiative reports to follow up 
reviews of legislation. However, the quota system governing the number of own-
initiative reports that can be produced and the fact that they are resource-intensive and 
time-consuming to prepare means that the opportunity for Committees to follow up 
reviews and evaluation work is limited. 
 
Impact assessment 
The Mandelkern Group defined ‘evaluation’ as consisting of two main types – ex ante 
evaluation where tools such as regulatory impact assessment and consultation are 
used and ex post, where the effectiveness of the regulation is examined, often against 
a checklist.143 This interpretation anticipates impact assessment as the first step in a 
two stage process of evaluation. It has been observed that not only has impact 
assessment been introduced in all the old fifteen Member States and in some new 
Member States like Poland, but also that impact assessment has become “the 
cornerstone of better regulation initiatives”.144 Furthermore, the three Institutions 
agree on the “positive contribution of impact assessments in improving the quality of 
Community legislation”.145 Research for this thesis has not revealed any kind of 
scientific basis for this assertion. Arguably, evaluation of the impact assessment itself 
coupled with evaluation of how the resulting legislation is working in practice would 
reveal an improvement in the quality of legislation in both its substance and its form, 
but of course part of the problem is the difficulty in measuring such a nebulous 
concept as ‘quality of legislation’. The Commission uses integrated impact analysis – 
a form of assessment that aims to include social and environmental concerns as well 
as economic analysis of the costs and benefits of regulatory proposals -  to evaluate all 
items in its work programme.146 Although there has been significant progress in both 
the quality and quantity of impact assessments, the Commission itself has recognised 
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that “more needs to be done to ensure that impact assessments are as comprehensive 
and rigorous as possible”.147 In 2005, the Parliament, Council and Commission 
reached an Interinstitutional agreement on better lawmaking148 in which the 
institutions agreed a common approach on how to assess the potential impacts of the 
legislation that they process and adopt.149 They agreed that not just initiatives but 
substantive amendments should also be subject to impact assessment that would map 
out potential impacts in an integrated and balanced way across social, economic and 
environmental factors and also potential short and long-term costs and benefits, 
including regulatory and budgetary implications.150 This is an ambitious aim and it 
remains to be seen whether it is achievable. 
 
There have been calls for the quality of impact assessments themselves to be reviewed 
as a part of developing “external quality control arrangements for identifying, ex post, 
good and bad practice in impact assessment by the institutions and highlighting where 
assessments do not meet the standards required”.151 The Doorn Report also called for 
the Commission to subject the quantitative results of the impact assessment to a 
regular critical analysis with a view to ascertaining whether the methodology used 
produces reliable predictions, and to report to Parliament on the results.152 Although 
the impact assessment of impact assessment may sound like a “bizarre and circular” 
concept,153 this is undertaken by the National Audit Office in the UK in relation to 
national impact assessments.154 This has been described as a “peculiar and innovative 
characteristic of the British system… and one of the rare cases in the EU of 
systematic ex-post review of regulatory tools and institutions”.155 And yet, ironically, 
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there is no systematic ex-post review of EU legislation in place at either EU or 
national level.  However, it is suggested that there is untapped potential for using 
impact assessment as a basis for later review. There does not yet appear to be 
evidence of this practice at EU level. Furthermore, given the developments in both 
impact assessment in the UK and at EU level, there could be scope in the future to 
marry UK and EU level assessments in order to provide an even more comprehensive 
basis for review. 
 
 
Respective Roles of the Institutions and Member States in Evaluation – Where 
should the responsibility lie? 
The European Economic and Social Committee has recognised the value of 
systematic post-legislative scrutiny and made it clear where the responsibility for it 
should not lie: 
 
Ex-post evaluation of directives and applied EU law has to be 
carried out systematically. As consultation is crucial for better 
lawmaking, similar procedures have to be foreseen for the process  
of ex-post evaluation. The original legislative bodies should not be 
responsible for such evaluations, which may also include the future 
need and relevance of certain rules.156   
 
This approach can be criticised as it neglects the potential value of evaluation as a 
reiterative learning exercise with the potential to feed back into the legislative process 
via the legislators. Conversely, in the UK, the House of Lords European Union 
Committee has recommended that “ex post assessment of the regulatory impact of EU 
legislation should be the rule rather than the exception and that the first such 
assessment should be carried out by the Commission no more than one year after the 
entry into force of the instrument in question”.157 This dichotomy of views illustrates 
starkly the problem of ownership of responsibility when it comes to evaluation of 
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legislation, crudely put: one has the feeling that everybody thinks it should be done 
but nobody wants to do it themselves! The European Policy Forum has observed that:  
 
Those with the most the learn from the evaluation of past successes 
and failures are the Commission with its responsibility for new 
initiatives, and the Member States themselves whose citizens carry 
the cost of any miscast legislation. A mechanism is needed to draw 
them in so that lessons can be absorbed in the most important 
places.158 
 
While there is undoubtedly merit in this observation, it is argued that the best 
approach to ex post evaluation of legislation, as part of better regulation, is that it is a 
responsibility that should be shared. This is a view that has been posited by the 
President of the Commission, José Mannuel Barroso who has stated that he intends 
the “better regulation effort to become a common effort not only of the European 
institutions, but also of the Community and the Member States – a mutual learning 
process in which we compare experiences and regulate better on all levels”.159 Lars 
Mitek-Pedersen,  Head of the Better Regulation and Impact Assessment Unit, 
Commission Secretariat General during an interview for this paper160, reiterated that 
better regulation is a shared responsibility between the Commission, the other EU 
institutions and the Member States. The particular roles of the Commission and 
Parliament are now considered in turn. 
 
The Commission 
Tito Gallas has written that:  
When tackling the subject of ex post assessment, what first comes 
into mind is the image of the Commission as the ‘guardian of the 
treaties’, the Commission monitoring the application of EC law. 
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This is in fact a task of crucial importance; legislation has not only 
to be made, it has, above all, to be applied.161 
 
It is true that the Commission has in place procedures to check the application of 
Community law in the Member States and that it also has the power to initiative 
enforcement proceedings against Member States which it considers to be in breach of 
their obligations under Community law.162  However, as Gallas has postulated, “this 
Commission monitoring examines compliance with an EC law, not its efficiency”.163 
During an interview with Lars Mitek-Pedersen,  Head of the Better Regulation and 
Impact Assessment Unit, Commission Secretariat General, Mr Mitek-Pedersen 
explained that the Commission had a long history of traditional economic evaluation 
as governed by the horizontal Financial Regulation, particularly within spending 
programmes and that every operational Directorate-General within the Commission 
contained an evaluation unit. He thought that the dawn of impact assessment brought 
a new, wider perspective to evaluation as did  other actions of the Commission's better 
regulation agenda, namely simplifying existing legislation and strategic planning and 
programming. Mr Mitek-Pedersen explained that transposition problems have always 
been on the Commission's radar but the Commission needs to know where the 
problems lie so that they can be resolved at Member State level or at EU level as 
appropriate.  He was also of the view that evaluation work in this context could be 
reinforced but represented positive potential for both the Commission and Member 
States as it could feed into evidence-based policy making for new initiatives and 
simplification initiatives. Mr Mitek-Pedersen recalled that the Commission had in 
recent years taken a progressively more strategic perspective on evaluation cutting 
across Directorates-General within the Commission.  
 
That it would be preferable for the Commission to undertake evaluation work itself is 
underlined by a recent experiment in which the Enterprise Directorate-General within 
the Commission contracted out evaluation work concerning four Directives to a 
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private management company. The company published a lengthy report164 which, on 
reading, appears to be of limited worth. The report itself acknowledges its limitations, 
recognising that the analysis simply provides information on the costs of companies 
related to meeting specific requirements contained in the four Directives analysed and 
departs from the common use and understanding of the concept of ex-post 
evaluation.165  Part of the problem may be that there is at present no best practice in 
terms of evaluative process or method.166 There have been calls for post-legislative 
scrutiny of EU legislation to be a distinct goal of the Commission. The European 
Policy Centre recently recommended that: “The Commission should systematically 
carry out and publish ex-post evaluations of EU legislation, including major 
comitology decisions. It should draw up a set of binding guidelines describing 
minimum standards and methodologies for assessing the benefits, costs and 
effectiveness of legislation, including unintended consequences. Ex-post evaluations 
should include quantitative analysis wherever possible”.167 Most significantly, the 
Doorn Report168, has recently called on “the Commission to report to Parliament, no 
later than three years after the entry into force of new legislation, on the impact of the 
legislation in practice; is above all interested in the question whether the legislation 
has fulfilled the original purpose, what effects it has had on the international 
competitiveness of the relevant sector, not least in the light of different regulations (or 
the absence of regulation) in competing countries, and how the legislation is complied 
with in practice”.169  This is huge step forward in the recognition of the importance of 
post-legislative scrutiny at EU level and it is to be welcomed. 
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The Parliament 
In the context of discussion about monitoring implementation, Mr Robert Bray, Legal 
Administrator to the Legal Affairs Committee of the European Parliament170 which 
has responsibility for better regulation, explained that if Members of the European 
Parliament are informed (if at all) about problems with implementation,  it tends to be 
interest groups  which feed through the information .  The Doorn Report171 however 
recently stressed the need for Parliament, and in particular, the rapporteur responsible 
to play a more active role in monitoring the implementation of European legislation in 
the Member States and to suggests that Parliament should set up a proper 
transposition-monitoring procedure in close cooperation with its national partners.172  
There is at least one example of post-legislative scrutiny by the Parliament, on the 
environmental directive known as the ‘Seveso directive’173 in which the Parliament 
appointed a committee of inquiry, the work of which culminated in an assessment of 
the transposition and application of the directive and an evaluation of its results. The 
committee also developed some principles for an all-round waste policy and 
translated the principles into demands to the Commission to draft legislative proposals 
in this matter.174 This form of evaluation is particularly valuable as it led to concrete 
outcomes. It is worth noting that there is little point in undertaking evaluation for its 
own sake; there must be a response to the outcomes of evaluation otherwise it 
becomes a pointless exercise. The McCarthy Report also recognised the vital role of 
the Parliament in evaluation:  
 
Introducing a system of both ex-ante and ex-post assessment, of 
EU laws, can lead to a better regulation cycle, enabling legislators 
to review and evaluate whether the legislation has achieved its 
objectives. The European Parliament must be fully involved in this 
                                                 
170 During an interview conducted by the author in the European Parliament in Brussels on 7 September 
2006. 
171 European Parliament Report on Better lawmaking 2004: application of the principle of subsidiarity 
– 12th annual report (2005/2055(INI)), Committee on Legal Affairs, Rapporteur: Bert Doorn, final, 
A6-008/2006, 23 March 2006. 
172 Ibid., at p 8, paras 28 and 29. 
173 (78/319/EEC). 
174 Ex post evaluation work on the ‘Seveso directive’ as described by  
Gallas, T, Evaluation in EC Legislation, Statute Law Review, 2001, Volume 22, Number 2, p 94. 
 47
process, and needs resources to enable the Committees to perform 
a scrutiny of EU law.175 
 
The publication of three seminal reports on better regulation in 2006, the Doorn 
Report, the McCarthy Report and the Frassoni Report, is very significant and 
demonstrates a growing awareness in the European Parliament of the need to evaluate 
legislation and the benefits it can offer to improving both the legislative process and 
the quality of the resulting legislation. 
  
 
Is there scope for a new independent evaluation body? 
There have been calls in the past for an external review body to help improve the 
quality of EU legislation. Sandström called for such as body to have a role in 
scrutinising proposals for new legislation.176 Setting up a new body would imply a 
major institutional operation, requiring Treaty reform; however, a less formal 
committee without institutional status would risk having no authority.177 Serious 
consideration was given to the proposition by the Koopmans Working Group and 
subsequently by the Intergovernmental Conference in 1997, during which it became 
apparent that the establishment of an independent review body was a bridge too far.178 
The UK was almost alone in supporting the proposal as a way of strengthening the 
organisation of the legislative process at EU level.179 There has also been some 
academic flirtation with the idea of a European Law Reform Commission. It is 
interesting to note that the Council of Europe in 1968 directed its Legal Committee to 
consider the idea of a permanent Law Commission.180 This was followed up by calls 
for such a body in order to prepare the ground for the codification of European civil 
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law.181 More recently, the former Chairman of the Law Commission for England and 
Wales noted that there are no similar law reform bodies among other European 
countries apart from the Republic of Ireland and suggested that “perhaps for the 21st 
century it is time for a European Law Reform Commission”.182  Indeed, in the current 
better regulation climate, there may be scope for an independent body with an 
evaluation function. In the context of discussion183 about the idea of a new 
independent agency to assist with evaluation work, Mr Mitek-Pedersen, Head of the 
Better Regulation and Impact Assessment Unit, European Commission Secretariat 
General, explained that the Commission would not be in favour of an independent 
agency that would have any involvement at the proposal stage or assessing the quality 
of impact assessment in real time (i.e. during the phase of preparation of Commission 
initiatives)  as this would hamper the Commission's right of initiative and would be 
inconceivable in the present Community system. However,  he was personally open to 
the idea of an external agency to be involved with ex post assessment to audit the 
quality of impact assessments and legislation. This would be akin to the work already 
undertaken by the Court of Auditors. The McCarthy Report, in March 2006, actually 
called for the Commission to set up an independent audit body to structure and 
guarantee the quality and independence of economic impact assessments of EU 
legislation.184 It is conceivable that if such a body were set up, its function could also 
extend to reviewing legislation after it has been brought into force, or at least advising 
on how this might be done and providing guidance on best practice. The rumblings of 
support for an independent review body are at a very early stage but it is contended 
that they reflect the fact that the importance of post-legislative scrutiny of European 
legislation is slowly but surely making its way up the European political agenda. 
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 PART 5: CONCLUSIONS: THE WAY FORWARD 
 
A changed climate 
It is an exciting time for the development of post-legislative scrutiny of European 
derived legislation at both the national and EU level. There has been movement away 
from a culture in which there was some acceptance of the old adage, “laws are like 
sausages, it is better not to see them being made”.185 Transparency is now demanded 
in the interests of democratic processes and accountability.  There used to be a front-
end focus on the Community machinery producing vast quantities of legislative 
output, which at its peak rose to 80 directives and 1500 regulations a year in the lead 
up to the deadline for completing the internal market.186 Now the emphasis is shifting 
to the end-user of this legislative output. The European Economic and Social 
Committee has defined better lawmaking as “meaning, primarily, looking at a 
situation from the viewpoint of the user of the legal instrument”.187 Implicit in this 
definition is the need for some form of evaluation or ‘quality control’ to see whether 
the end product of the legislative machine is actually working in practice. 
 
A shared responsibility 
The first research question was to examine what work is already undertaken at 
domestic and EU level in terms of monitoring the effects of past legislation in order to 
ensure that it has met its objectives and is working in practice as intended. The answer 
also links in with the fourth question about the role of impact assessment. The 
analysis in this paper has revealed that very little post-legislative scrutiny work is 
undertaken in real terms. It has been necessary, particularly at UK level, to examine 
the scrutiny systems that are in already place as a way, first of all, of revealing the 
evaluation gap, and second, on a more positive note of exposing the potential for 
evaluation of EU-derived legislation. The utility of regulatory impact assessment as a 
tool for better regulation (in the sense of improving the quality of legislation) and as a 
basis for evaluation must not be underestimated. It is already becoming embedded in  
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UK regulatory soil and it is a useful tool which should be adapted to give 
consideration to monitoring and review more effectively, especially in relation to 
instruments transposing Directives, for which scrutiny prior to enactment is limited. 
Similarly, at EU level, there is really very little evidence of real work in terms of 
evaluating the effects of legislation once it has been brought into force, although there 
are a few examples. Impact assessment offers hope here too not least as a starting 
point for a later review. The fact that there are drives towards assessing the quality of 
impact assessments indicates that the review of legislation to which the impact 
assessment relates cannot be far behind. 
 
The second research question posed at the beginning of this paper was: how does 
evaluation work fit in with the drives towards better regulation and better lawmaking? 
The analysis has revealed that evaluation and subsequent adaptation of the legislation 
if necessary has not been a feature of the legislative methodology as described by 
Professor Mader188, at national or EU level. This paper was not able to accommodate 
a full examination of all initiatives that could be described as falling within the broad 
and unwieldy aim of better regulation, but the analysis was sufficient to disclose that 
rather than riding on the crest of the better regulation wave, the concept of evaluation 
has been lingering in the undercurrent. However, there are signs that it is beginning to 
be swept along with the better regulation agenda and this is true for the EU and 
national context.  
 
The fourth research question concerns the future -  what further work should be 
undertaken in terms of evaluation of past measures and which body should take lead 
responsibility for this work in order to ensure a coherent approach?  This is perhaps 
the most difficult question. At the national level there are Parliamentary and 
Governmental systems in place that could, with political will, be adapted to allow for 
more systematic scrutiny of EU derived legislation. At EU level, it may be premature 
to talk about mechanisms when responsibility is still an issue and when evaluation is 
still very much in its infancy and at a conceptual stage. However, the first steps have 
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been taken – the three European Parliament reports189 this year alone drawing 
attention to the need for evaluation bear testament to that. The next logical step (some 
would argue giant leap) is for the ideas to be translated into action. Any procedural 
change at EU or national level is bound to be evolutionary rather than revolutionary 
but it will be better to have a carefully thought out review system which is capable of 
feeding back its results into the legislative process, with a view to improving 
legislation, rather than imposing a burdensome system in haste. To pick up on the last 
research question, there is scope for a new independent body to assist the EU 
institutions (and Member States) with evaluating past legislation, such a body would 
also have the added advantage of being able to provide a focal point for evaluation 
and perhaps to give guidance on  the continuing efforts to improve the quality of 
legislation and critically, to provide a link between the institutions of the EU and 
Member States. 
 
In the final analysis, to borrow de Wilde’s words: deficient European legislation is in 
nobody’s interest.190 It is for this reason that post-legislative scrutiny of legislation 
derived from the EU should be a shared responsibility between the institutions and the 
Member States. Evaluation has woven a way through swathes of material on better 
regulation but not as the principle thread to colour the approach. However, better 
regulation should be about ensuring good quality legislation to which, it must be 
recognised, evaluation can make a valuable contribution. 
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